Synapse
⌘+K
Synapse
PulseExploreClubsResearchersJournals
Instagram
HomeClubsExplore
October 1, 2025Scientific ReportsOpen Access

A stochastic evolutionary game of boosting urban low-carbon development in China

View Full Paper
Ask AI
Bookmark
Share

Authors

RCRongjiang CaiELEdmund HoiNgan LoiXWXi Wang

Discussion

Loading...

Member takes

Overview

This analysis reveals strategies for enhancing government subsidy and public participation in low-carbon urban development amid environmental uncertainty.

Key Points

  • Active public participation can replace some government regulation, encouraging low-carbon initiatives.
  • Government subsidies can discourage participation when set excessively high, highlighting the need for optimized structures.
  • Enterprise behavior shows high sensitivity to social losses, motivating low-carbon solutions when these losses are minimized.
  • Public engagement is most influenced by compensation mechanisms from enterprises, emphasizing the need for alignment.

Cite This Study

Cai et al. (2025) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/68dd89e6fe798ba2fc4980fdhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-06698-z
View Full Paper
Ask AI
Bookmark
Share

Also Consider

Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context:

  1. 1Motivating grassroots governments in low-carbon transition: comparative analysis of two quadripartite evolutionary game2025
  2. 2Game-Optimization Modeling of Shadow Carbon Pricing and Low-Carbon Transition in the Power Sector2025
  3. 3Modeling the Evolutionary Mechanism of Multi-Stakeholder Decision-Making in the Green Renovation of Existing Residential Buildings in China2025
  4. 4Research on Urban Low-Carbon Economy2025
  5. 5Game analysis of green finance assisting enterprises in carbon reduction under the participation of four parties2025 · 1 citations